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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-seven years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Katz v.
United Statest that the Fourth Amendment2 to the U.S. Constitution
"protects people not places."3 Despite the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of individual privacy rights in general, the Court in Katz did not
extend its endorsement to the employees of private companies. The
Fourth Amendment does protect against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures,4 and the Supreme Court has held that the prohibition
against such unwarranted intrusions extends to federal, state, and
local government employees in cases of searches made by their
employers.5 Private sector employees, however, do not benefit from
this Fourth Amendment protection where a search is conducted by
their employer in a non-law enforcement capacity.6
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Katz overruled Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which concluded that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because no actual physical intrusion takes place. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. Katz
held that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unauthorized interception of their
telephone communications by the Government. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
4. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,715 (1987) (stating that although Fourth Amend-
ment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, determining whether search is
reasonable depends in part on existence of reasonable expectation of privacy).
5. Id. at 724-25. In O'Connor, the Court considered the applicability of Fourth Amendment
privacy rights to non-court-ordered searches of public employee's offices. Id. at 711-12. In that
case, a state-run hospital in California, having been made aware of allegations of wrongdoing
by an employee, searched the employee's office and confiscated personal items. Id. at 713. The
Court concluded that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy within the confines
of his office. Id. at 718. Therefore, government employers must first have reasonable grounds
for making warrantless searches. Id. at 724-25.
6. See Alfred G. Feliu & Wayne N. Outten, Privacy in the Employment Relationship, in 2
PRIvACY LAW AND PRACrICE 1 9.02[3] [d] (George B. Trubow ed., 1991) (noting that employees
of private companies do not enjoy Fourth Amendment constitutional protections from employer
searchers, as do their publicly employed counterparts).
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The lack of constitutional protection for private sector employees
has been made all the more critical by technological advances in the
workplace. In particular, growing reliance by businesses on E-mail"
and voice mail8 communications systems has created many new
opportunities for private sector employers to monitor the perfor-
mance and conduct of their employees without the employees
knowing.9 The risks to the privacy of workplace communications
were recently evidenced by a survey of 301 employers conducted by
Macworld magazine." In this survey, Macworld sought information
from employers in a broad spectrum of industries regarding the
extent to which the employers monitor employee computer, E-mail,
and voice mail systems." The results showed that twenty-two percent
of the respondents had "engaged in searches of employee computer
files, voice mail, electronic mail, or other networking communica-
7. E-mail is the common term used for electronic mail, and encompasses a number of
differing technologies. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVACY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO.
647]. Congress described E-mail as a service that allows two parties to "transmit a digital
message" between two computer terminals through a service provider, where it is maintained
in electronic storage until accessed by the recipient. I& at 63. In the context of data
communications, the term "digital" describes the binary output of a computer. DANIEL ABELOW
& EDWiNJ. HILPERT, COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MODERN CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 225 (1986).
A digital signal can only be one of two discrete units (off/on). Id.; see also Russell S. Burnside,
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The Challenge of Applying Ambiguous Statutor
Language to Intricate Telecommunication Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 451,483
n.213 (1987) (describing E-mail as service that allows two parties to send messages via third-party
routing service).
As of 1992, estimates showed that 20 million Americans were a part of an E-mail service.
Electronic Mail Raises Issues About Privacy, Experts Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at A-7, A-8
(Nov. 17, 1992). Projections indicate that E-mail usage will be double the 1992 estimate by the
turn of the century, with some 60 billion messages being transmitted per year. Scott Dean, E-
Mail Forces Companies to Grapple with Privacy Issues, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1993, at 11.
8. During congressional consideration of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Congress noted that "voice mail" was similar to E-mail, and operated in a similar manner.
H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 63. Voice mail, however, differs from E-mail in that the
messages take "the form of the sender's voice." Id
Voice mail systems generally "consist of some type of computer, an analog-to-digital voice
processing subsystem, disk storage, and software to provide the mailbox and answering machine
environment." STEPHEN A. CASWELL, E-MAIL 191 (1988). The human voice in this context is
digitized directly by the computer and stored as a digital pattern. JOSEPH ST. JOHN BATE,
MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO OFFICE AUTOMATION 163 (1987). The computer "listens to" and
duplicates, in digital form, the entire voice message of the sender. Id. On the receiving end,
the digital message is converted back to analog form and emerges as a voice over the telephone.
Id. The term analog, as used in data communications, describes the wave or signal (such as the
human voice), whose value changes continuously. ABELOW & HiLPERT, supra note 7, at 223. For
such waves to be transmitted over a telephone line, a digital or pulse output must be converted
to an analog signal. Id.
9. See Charles Piller, Bosses With X-Ray Eyes, MACVORLD, July 1993, at 118, 123 (chart)
(indicating that 66.2% of employers responding to survey who engage in monitoring did not
inform employees that monitoring was taking place).
10. Id. at 123.
11. Id. at 120.
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tions." 12 Of that twenty-two percent of employers, slightly more than
sixty-six percent of them confirmed that they conducted employee
monitoring without the employees' knowledge or consent.
13
Given the apparent scope of employer monitoring and the rate at
which new technologies are being introduced into the workplace,
what, if any, right of confidentiality should employees of private
companies expect in their communications? A partial answer to this
question may be found in the remedies provided by Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196814 (Title III),
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 198615 (ECPA),
which substantially amended Title III.1" These provisions, commonly
12. Id. The MACWORLD investigation further found that in companies with 1000 or more
employees, the number of employers indicating that they had monitored employee communica-
tions rose to 30%. Id. Applying this percentage to the American workforce, Charles Piller, the
article's author, estimates that the extent of employer workplace monitoring encompasses
approximately 20 million workers based on computer systems alone, i.e., excluding employer
monitoring of basic telephone systems. Id. The Macworld survey received responses indicating
that 41.5% of the companies accessed employee E-mail systems, 15.4% listened to employee
voice mail messages, 73.8% had perused employee's electronic work files, and 27.7% had
accessed employee network messages. Id. at 123 (chart). The apparent willingness of employers
to eavesdrop on employee communications, as evidenced by the Macworld study, is in sharp
contrast to the belief by employees that their communications are private and should not be
monitored by employers even if the capability to monitor exists. See Caroline M. Cooney, Who's
Watching the Workplace? The Electronic Monitoring Debate Spreads to Capitol Hill, SECURITY MGMT.,
Nov. 1991, at 26, 29 (citing August 1991 reader survey conducted by Nation's Business, in which
64% of respondents indicated that employers should be required to notify employees in advance
of employer monitoring and 25% believed that employers should notify employees when
monitoring is actually occurring).
13. Piller, supra note 9, at 118, 123 (chart).
14. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
15. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521,
2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
16. Title III and the ECPA are by no means the only source of redress for an employee
aggrieved by employer workplace monitoring. In addition to other federal enactments
protecting privacy, such as the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988), and FCC
regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 2.701 (1993), and common law tort claims for invasion of privacy, the
following state legislatures have created their own private rights of action for illegal wiretapping,
which substantially parallel federal law. Most of these states award actual or statutory damages
of$100 per day of violation or $1000, whichever is greater, in addition to reasonable attorney's
fees and costs. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 629.36 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing civil
remedies for any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, including actual
damages, "but not less than liquidated damages" of $100 per day for each day violation
continued or $1000, whichever is greater, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and
other costs of litigation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336(w) (1987) (establishing civil remedy
for any person whose wire or oral communications are intercepted and allowing for recovery of
either actual damages or statutory damages of $100 per day for each day violation continued or
$1000, whichever is greater, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and litigation costs); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-554(a) (1981) (providing civil remedies for any person whose wire or oral
communications are intercepted, including actual damages or greater of liquidated damages of
$100 per day for each day of violation or $1000, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees,
and costs); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 934.10 (1993) (establishing private right of action for any person
whose wire or oral communication is intercepted and allowing for recovery of actual damages
or statutory damages of either $100 per day for each day violation continued, or $1000,
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whichever is greater, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 803-48(A)-(C) (1985 & Supp. 1992) (providing civil remedy for any person whose wire, oral,
or electronic communications are accessed or intercepted and allowing for recovery of actual
damages or greater of liquidated damages of $100 per day for each day of violation or $10,000,
punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs, or equitable or declaratory relief
where appropriate); IDAHO CODE § 18-6709 (1987) (creating private right of action for any
person whose wire or oral communications are intercepted and allowing for recovery of either
actual damages or statutory damages of $100 per day for each day of violation or $1000, which-
ever is greater, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and litigation costs); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 720, para. 5/14-6(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing for civil remedies where eavesdropping
on conversation has occurred, and allowing for injunction against further eavesdropping, and
actual and punitive damages); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-5-4(a) (1993) (establishing private right
of action for any person whose communications are intercepted, and providing for recovery ol
either actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $100 per day for each day of
violation or $1000, whichever is greater, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and court
costs); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808B.8.1 (extended to July 1, 1999) (West 1994) (allowing any party
whose wire or oral communications are intercepted to recover greater of actual damages or
statutory damages of not less than $100 per day for each day of violation or $1000, punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and costs); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2518(1) (1988) (establishing private
right of action for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communications are intercepted,
and allowing for recovery of actual damages or statutory damages of either $100 per day for each
day violation continued or $1000, whichever is greater, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's
fees, and costs); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 711 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993) (creating civil
remedy for any person whose conversation is intercepted in violation of this section, and
providing for recovery of actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $100 per day
for each day of violation, attorney's fees, and costs); MD. CODE ANN., Grs. &JUD. PROC. § 10-
410(a) (1993) (providing civil remedy for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions are intercepted and allowing recovery of either actual damages, or greater of statutory
damages of $100 per day for each day violation continued, or $1000, punitive damages,
attorney's fees, and costs); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99Q (West 1990) (establishing civil
remedy for any person whose wire or oral communications are intercepted, and providing for
recovery of either actual damages or statutory damages of $100 per day for each day violation
continued, or $1000, whichever is greater, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs); MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.539h (West 1991) (allowing any party on whom eavesdropping is
practiced to receive an injunction, and actual and punitive damages); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626A.13(1)-(3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1994) (providing civil remedy for any person whose wire,
electronic, or oral communication is intercepted, and allowing for temporary or other equitable
or declaratory relief, treble damages or statutory damages of $100 per day for each day of
violation or $10,000, whichever is greater, attorney's fees, and litigation costs); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-29-529(1) (1993) (establishing civil remedy for any person whose wire or oral communica-
tions are intercepted and allowing for recovery of actual damages or statutory damages of $100
per day for each day violation continued or $1000, whichever is greater, punitive damages,
attorney's fees, and costs); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-707.02 (Supp. 1992) (creating private right of
action for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communications are intercepted, and
providing for preliminary or equitable or declaratory relief, actual damages or greater of
statutory damages of $100 per day for each day of violation or $10,000, and attorney's fees);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:11 (1986)- (providing civil action to any person whose wire or oral
communications are intercepted and allowing recovery of actual damages or greater of statutory
damages of $100 per day for each dayviolation continued or $1000, punitive damages, attorney's
fees, and costs); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-24(a)-(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (extended to
July 1, 1999) (establishing private right of action for any person whose wire or oral communica-
tions are intercepted and allowing recovery of actual damages or greater of statutory damages
of $100 per day for each day violation continued or $1000, punitive damages, attorney's fees,
and costs); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-11(A) (Michie 1984) (establishing private right of action
for any person whose wire or oral communications are intercepted and allowing recovery of
actual damages or greater of statutory damages of $100 per day for each day violation continued
or $1000, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2933.65(A)
(Baldwin 1992) (establishing private right of action for any person whose wire or oral
communications are intercepted and allowing recovery of actual damages or $200 per day for
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referred to as the Wiretap statute, 7 have been judicially interpreted
to offer a limited degree of privacy protection for the telephone
communications of private-company employees.18 Whether such
protection extends to E-mail and voice mail communications is
presently unclear, although some commentators have suggested that
Title III and the ECPA do not encompass these technologies with
respect to private employers. 9 This Comment argues that the intent
each day violation continued up to $2000, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs); OR. REV.
STAT. § 133.739(1) (1993) (providing civil cause of action to any person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communications are intercepted and allowing recovery of actual damages, but notless
than $100 per day for each day violation continued or $1000, whichever is greater, punitive
damages, and attorney's fees at trial and on appeal); CRIMES & OFFENSES PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5725(a) (1983 & Supp. 1992) (creating private right of action for any person whose wire, oral,
or electronic communications are intercepted and allowing for recovery of actual damages or
greater of statutory damages of $100 per day for each day of violation or $1000, punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and costs); RI. GEN. LAWS § 12-5.1-13 (1981) (establishing civil remedy
for any person whose wire or oral communications are intercepted and allowing recovery of
actual damages or greater of statutory damages of $100 per day for each day violation continued
or $1000, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and litigation costs); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-
11 (1)-(3) (1990) (providing private right of action for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communications are intercepted and allowing for preliminary or other equitable or declaratory
relief as appropriate or statutory damages of $100 per day for each day of violation or $10,000,
whichever is greater, punitive damages and, attorney's fees, and costs); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-69
(Michie 1990) (establishing civil cause of action for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communications are intercepted and allowing for recovery of actual damages or greater of
statutory damages of $100 per day for each day violation continued or $1000, punitive damages,
attorney's fees, and costs); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.060 (1992) (providing private right of action
for any person whose privacy is violated within meaning of this chapter and allowing recovery
of actual damages, including mental pain and suffering, or statutory damages of $100 per day
for each day of violation up to $1000, attorneys fees, and costs); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-ID-
12(a) (1992) (establishing civil remedy for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communications are intercepted and allowing for recovery of actual damages, but not less than
$100 per day for each day violation continued, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (2m) (West Supp. 1993) (providing civil remedy for any person whose wire,
oral, or electronic communications are intercepted and allowing recovery of actual damages or
greater of statutory damages of $100 per day for each day violation continued or $1000, punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and costs); WYO. STAT. § 7-3-609(a) (1987 & Supp. 1993) (creating
private right of action for any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communications are
intercepted and allowing recovery of actual damages, but not less than $1000 per day for each
day violation continued, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs).
Further, many states recognize both common law and statutory rights to privacy, which can
be used as the basis for civil damages against invasions of privacy. See Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act: Hearing on S.984 Before the Subcomm. onEmployment and Productivity of the Senate Comm.
on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1993) (Statement of Lewis L. Maltby,
Director, ACLU National Task Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace) (noting that almost
all states have common law right to privacy, but recognizing limitation of common law in
employment context). This Comment, however, focuses only on the private rights of action
created under Title III and the ECPA.
17. See S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3556-57.
18. See infra Part II (discussing cases applying Federal Wiretap Statute as source of
protection for private telephone conversations made at workplace).
19. See, e.g., Ruel T. Hernandez, ECPA and Online ComputerPrivaty, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 17,
39 (1987) (stating that under stored communications provisions of ECPA, employer will not be
liable for accessing E-mail or voice mall communications of employees, even where third parties
would be liable for similar conduct); Holly Metz, They've Got Their Eyes on You, STUDENT LAW.,
E-MAIL AND VOICE MAIL PRIVACY
of Title III and the ECPA, based on the extensive legislative histories
supporting both enactments, was to enhance privacy protection,
irrespective of technological advancement, but that current judicial
application of Title III and the ECPA falls short of this intent.
Part I of this Comment reviews the language of Title III and the
ECPA, and attempts to decipher Congress' intent with respect to
employer monitoring. Part II examines the judicial application of
Title III and the ECPA in the workplace monitoring context. Part III
uses the existing case law to analogize the applicability of these
provisions to employee privacy rights with respect to E-mail and voice
mail systems, and attempts to reconcile the inconsistent court
holdings arising from differing interpretations of the statutes.2"
Finally, Part IV of this Comment recommends that Congress modify
Title III and the ECPA to affirmatively bring emerging office
technologies within the purview of these statutes.
I. CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Title III
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 was the first congressional response to the Supreme Court's
holding in Katz." Congress intended Title III to comprehensively
Feb. 1994, at 22, 23 (citing Lewis Maltby, attorney for ACLU, who states that employees in
private sector have no legal recourse under existing legislation);Julia T. Baumhart, Comment,
The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-Mail" Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. I.AW. 923,
926 (1992) (arguing that lack of discussion about issue in legislative history of ECPA indicates
Congress did not intend statute to prevent employers from accessing employee E-mail).
20. The difficulty federal courts have had in determining the applicability of Title III in the
context of employer workplace monitoring was well expressed by Judge Charles C. Goldberg of
the Fifth Circuit:
We might wish we had planted a powerful electronic bug in a Congressional
antechamber to garner every clue concerning Title III, for we are once again faced
with the troublesome task of an interstitial interpretation of an amorphous Congres-
sional enactment. Even a clear bright beam of statutory language can be obscured by
the mirror of Congressional intent. Here, we must divine the will of Congress when
all recorded signs point to less than full reflection. But, alas, we lack any sophisticated
sensor of Congressional whispers, and are remitted to our more primitive tools. With
them, we can only hope to measure Congress' general clime. So we engage our wind
vane and barometer and seek to measure the direction of the Congressional vapors
and the pressures fomenting them. Our search for lightening bolts of comprehension
traverses a fog of inclusions and exclusions which obscures both the parties' burdens
and the ultimate goal.
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
21. See OFFICE OFTECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOL-
OGY: ELECFRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 18 (1985) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE] (noting that Title III was first major congressional action concerning surveillance
and was drafted to conform with Katz).
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regulate the use of wiretaps and hidden microphones 22 on all
communications transmitted via common carrier.23  Although
Congress intended Title III to regulate primarily Government use of
wiretaps and other surveillance media,24 the statute applies to private
individuals and businesses as well.' Specifically, § 2511 of Tite III
prohibited the actual or attempted willful interception of any "wire or
oral communication";26 the actual or attempted willful use of
22. See id. at 3.
23. Section 2510(10) of Title III defines a "communication common carrier" by cross-
reference to the ambiguous definition of that term contained in the Communications Act of
1934: "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign com-
munication by wire." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988). Federal Communications Commission
regulations are equally vague, defining a communications common carrier as "[a]ny person
engaged in rendering communication service for hire to the public." 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1993).
Fortunately, the courts have clarified these circuitous definitions. In National Ass'n oflRegulatorj
Utility Commissioners v. FCC the court summarized the criteria a company must meet in order
to be considered a communications common carrier. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The company must have a quasi-public
character and must provide similar service to all potential and willing users, even if the service
is specialized or the number of potential users is limited. Id.; see also National Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that carrier falls within
definition of common carrier if it does not "make only individualized decisions, in particular
cases, whether and on what terms to deal"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). This "public"
criterion is the key distinction between public common carriers and private companies, the latter
providing service to particular customers of the company's own choosing. National Ass'n of
Regulatory UtiL Comm'rs, 525 F.2d at 642.
24. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-76 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2157-63 (explaining that Wiretap statute's main purpose is to regulate use of wiretapping
and electronic surveillance by law enforcement officials in combatting organized crime); Martha
W. Barnett & Scott D. Makar, "In the Ordinary Course of Business": The Legal Limits of Workplace
Wiretapping, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 715, 718 (1988) (stating that primary purpose of
federal wiretap statute is to regulate law enforcement, but noting that statute also applies to
individuals and corporations).
25. Barnett & Makar, supra note 24, at 718. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution
provides authority for federal control of wiretapping. SeeWeiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321,
327 (1939). The Supreme Court has upheld federal legislation prohibiting wiretapping of
interstate or intrastate telephone conversations by federal and state law enforcement officers.
See Weiss, 308 U.S. at 327 (suppressing evidence of insurance fraud gained through interception
of intrastate telephone communications without authorization); Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379, 382 (1937) (holding that evidence gained by tapping interstate phone conversations
wvas not admissible under statute prohibiting interception of such communication unless
authorized by statute). Legislation prohibiting wiretapping by private persons may also be
adopted and enforced by the Federal Government under the Commerce Clause. See United
States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1957) (rejecting argument of defendant convicted of
illegal private wiretapping that only interstate, not intrastate, communications are protected).
26. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1) (a) (1988)). Titie III defined a "wire communication" as "any communication made
in whole or in part through the use of [common carrier] facilities for the [interstate or foreign]
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the
point of origin and the point of reception." Id. at 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2510(1)). An "oral communication" was defined as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation [of privacy]." Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2510(2)). The term "interception" is defined as an "aural acquisition of the contents ofany wire
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." Id.
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)).
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"electronic, mechanical or other device to intercept any oral
communication";27 and the actual or attempted willful disclosure or
use of "the contents of any wire or oral communication."28 Section
2520 of Title III established a private right of action for these
enumerated violations of § 2511.29
1. Limitations of the 1968 version of Title III
Congress enacted Title III at a time when the primary means for
intercepting communications was "limited ... to simple telephone
taps and concealed microphones,"" and the two primary modes of
communication were either "telephone conversations"" or "face-to-
face oral communications." 2 While Title III reflected the prevalent
technologies of the era, it failed to account for future develop-
ments.33 Title III expressly protected against only the unauthorized
aural interception of a communication. 34 Thus, there was no Title
III protection against the interception of "text, digital or machine
communication '3 5 because in these sources of communication, there
are no audible sounds to intercept. In addition, for wire communica-
tions, the statute protected only those communications traversing the
facilities of a common carrier, while for oral communications, only
27. Id. at 215 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)).
28. Id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d)).
29. See id. at 223 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2520) (providing that any person may
bring civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses any wire or oral
communication). Under § 2520, damages are the greater of the sum of actual damages or
statutory damages of $100 per day of violations or $10,000, whichever is greater. Attorney's fees
and costs also may be awarded to a successful plaintiff. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2).
30. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 3.
31. H.R REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 17. The House report on the ECPA noted that even
though Title III was less than 20 years old, it reflected a "different technological and regulatory
era" where "[c ] ommunications were almost exclusively in the form of transmission of the human
voice over common carrier networks ... [and] the contents of a traditional telephone call
disappeared once the words [were] transmitted." Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 17.
33. See H.1R REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 17 (stating that Congress "did not attempt to
address the interception of text, digital or machine communication").
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988) (providing that "interception," by definition, can only be
accomplished through "aural acquisition" of contents of "any wire or oral communication").
"Aural" involves acquisition through the sense of hearing. There is no statutory definition of
"aural." As noted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, lacking a statutory
definition, the meaning ascribed should be the one commonly accepted. United States v.
Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 157 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979); see also United States
v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating that under § 2510(4), term "intercept"
unambiguously equates "with listening to, monitoring, or hearing"), affld, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated on othergrounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.
Ohio 1972) (noting that literal understanding of "aural acquisition" means to "come into
possession through the sense of hearing").
35. H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 17 (recognizing that these forms of communication
were not as common as telephone communication or face-to-face oral communication).
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conversations made under conditions demonstrating a reasonable
expectation of privacy were protected. 6
2. When is an interception not an interception?
The 1968 version of Title III provided that an oral or wire
communication was intercepted only if aurally acquired through the
use of "any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 37  Efforts by
federal courts to construe the meaning of this language have led to
disparate results.38 One of the first cases to test Title III in a private
employer context was United States v. Chrstman.39  Although
Christman involved a criminal prosecution and not a suit for civil
damages,' ° the district court still addressed whether Title III's
protection applied to communications transmitted via a private phone
system.
41
a. United States v. Christman
In the 1974 case United States v. Christman, the defendant, a security
manager for a department store, was charged with illegally intercept-
ing and recording an employee's telephone calls by using an
extension telephone in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (a), which
prohibited, inter alia, the interception of a wire communication.42
The defendant's employer operated a "closed dial" telephone system,
which allowed employees to place calls within the store, and to other
stores in the same chain.4' The "closed dial" system could be used
to place outside calls, but such calls required the assistance of a
switchboard operator, and, in any event, were strictly limited to
"special circumstances." 4 In response to allegations that the store's
telephone system was being used for improper purposes, and in some
instances for illegal conduct, the defendant installed an extension
36. H.tR REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that passage of Title III was Congress'
response to unregulated ability of Government to eavesdrop, but that Title III still provides for
permissible government interception of communications).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
38. Compare United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (conclud-
ing that extension telephone is not intercepting device under Title III) with United States v.
Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that surreptitious recording of private
conversation by use of extension telephone violated Title III).
39. 375 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
40. Christman, 375 F. Supp. at 1355 (noting that Congress intended to apply criminal
sanctions to certain interceptions of communications).
41. Id.
42. Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text (defining base violation under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (1) (a) as actual or attempted willful interception of any "wire or oral communication").
43. Christman, 375 F. Supp. at 1355.
44. Id.
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telephone without a court order,4 5 allowing him to pick up and
monitor calls on the "closed dial" system.46
The district court, in finding the defendant not guilty of illegal
wiretapping, drew a number of conclusions regarding the scope of
Title III. First, the court focused on the statutory reference to
"common carrier" facilities in § 2510(1). 7 Relying on the legislative
history of Title III, the court concluded that the statute was not
intended to cover "privately operated intercommunication" systems,
but rather only systems that are provided by a common carrier would
be subject to Title III.'
Second, the court focused on the "oral" communications provisions
of Title III, and noted that such communications are protected only
where the speaker is demonstrating a reasonable expectation of
privacy.49  The court gauged the reasonableness of the privacy
expectation by the employee's improper use of the telephone,
concluding that it would be unreasonable for employees "misusing a
private telephone system" to expect "that the communication is not
subject to interception."5
Finally, the court looked to the language of § 2510(5) (a) of Title
II151 and concluded that an extension telephone is not an intercept-
ing device within the meaning of the statute.52 The district court
wasted few words explaining this view," evidently relying on its view
of the section's plain language. Thus, in accordance with §
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a) (ii) (A) (1988) (prescribing that providers of wire or
electronic communication service are authorized to intercept wire, oral, or electronic
communications if such provider has court order to do so).
46. Christman, 375 F. Supp. at 1355; see also United States v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140, 1142
(N.D. Iowa 1972) (holding that first essential element of Title InI violation is wire communi-
cation utilizing facilities of common carrier); ELECTRONIC SURvEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 37
(stating that private carrier communications systems are not within definition of "wire
communication" under Title Ill).




51. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) of the 1968 version of Title III provided that an "[e]lectronic,
mechanical, or other device" includes any apparatus that can be used to intercept a wire or oral
communication, "except (a) any telephone ... instrument, equipment or facility, or any
component thereof, (i) being furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common
carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the
ordinary course of its business." Id. This language has been termed the "business extension
exception" and requires that (1) the extension telephone have been provided to the user by a
communications common carrier in the ordinary course of that carrier's business, and (2) that
the recipient of the extension telephone have used it in a manner consistent with the ordinary
course of its business. Id.
52. Christman, 375 F. Supp. at 1355.
53. Id. (dismissing claim that extension telephone can be intercepting device in single
sentence).
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2510(5) (a), an extension telephone provided by a communications
common carrier in the ordinary course of business, which is used by
the subscriber in the ordinary course of business, is incapable of being
an "intercepting device."54
b. Other court decisions
In Campiti v. Walonis,55 decided in 1979, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals flatly rejected the conclusion reached in Christman that there
existed an "extension telephone" exception to liability under
§ 2510(5) (a).6 The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Harpel,57 also
rejected the Christman approach, concluding that the surreptitious
recording of a private conversation with an extension telephone
violated the spirit and purpose of Title III, which was the protection
of privacy." The courts' disparate application of the provisions of
Title III did not go unnoticed by congressional observers. 9 Over
time, the statute underwent numerous modifications,0 but it was not
54. Id. The result in Christman came about because at the time Title III was enacted there
were few private carriers. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 2-3, repinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3556-57 (discussing proliferation of companies offering telecommunications services following
AT&T divestiture and deregulation). The provisions of Title III were aimed at protecting the
privacy of an individual who was utilizing one of the public common carriers in existence at the
time. Under § 2510(5) (a) of Title III, equipment provided to the subscriber by a communica-
tions common carrier, and used in the subscriber's ordinary course of business, did not satisfy
the definition of an intercepting device. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing
pre-ECPA "extension telephone exception").
55. 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979).
56. Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387,392 (1st Cir. 1979) (basing its conclusion on purpose
of statute, which is to prohibit unlawful monitoring and, as such, nature of equipment used to
conduct such monitoring should not be part of inquiry).
57. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
58. See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that telephone
extension used without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record private telephone
conversations is not used in ordinary course of business).
59. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3556 (citing
statement of Senator Leahy that pre-ECPA Title III was "hopelessly out of date").
60. The first set of amendments were in 1970. See Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211 (a), 84
Stat. 654 (1970) (adding § 2511(2)(a)(ii) relating to telephone company assistance in
wiretapping); Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. III, § 227(a), 84 Stat. 930 (1970) (deleting § 2514 relating
to immunity); Pub. L. No. 91-452, tits. VIII, IX, XI, §§ 810, 902(a), 1103, 84 Stat. 940, 947, 959
(1990) (adding obstruction of state or local law enforcement, gambling, and racketeering
offenses to crimes encompassed by § 2516(1) (c)); Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 902(b), 84 Stat.
947 (1970) (expanding scope of permissible disclosure under § 2517(3)); Pub. L. No. 91-358,
tit. II, § 211(b), 84 Stat. 654 (1970) (authorizing orders compelling telephone company
assistance in § 2518(4)); Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211(c), 84 Stat. 654 (1970) (expanding
good faith defense of § 2520 to include reliance on legislative authorization).
The 1971 amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-644, tit. IV, § 16, 84 Stat. 1891 (1971), added assaults,
and other attacks on members of Congress, the Cabinet, and the Supreme Court to the crimes
encompassed by § 2516(1) (c).
The 1978 amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. II, § 201(a)-(d), 92 Stat. 1796, 1797 (1978),
deleted § 2511(3), which related to national security surveillance and amended
§§ 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2518(4), 2518(9), 2518(10)(a), and 2519(3) to conform to the Foreign
1994] E-MAIL AND VOICE MAIL PRIVACY
until the substantial 1986 amendments that Congress significantly
addressed the risk of private employer interceptions of employee
communications using emerging technologies.6"
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
By 1985, the telecommunications landscape had changed dramati-
cally from that of Title III's original 1986 enactment.62 Both the
communications technology and the means of electronic surveillance
experienced a revolution.63 In response to this new technological
topography, Congress instructed the congressional Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment (OTA) to perform a study and report on "technologi-
cal developments in the basic communication and information
infrastructure of the United States that present new or changed
opportunities for and vulnerabilities to electronic surveillance."'
Focusing on new developments in wire and electronic communica-
tions, the OTA found that revolutionary changes to the U.S. tele-
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988). In addition, Pub. L. No.
95-598, tit. III, § 314(h), 92 Stat. 2677 (1978) conformed language in § 2516(1) (c) regarding
bankruptcy fraud to reflect amendments to the bankruptcy laws.
The 1982 amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-285, §§ 2(e), 4(e), 96 Stat. 1220, 1221 (1982)
conformed § 2516(1) (c) to amendments to 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1751, which related to assaults and
other attacks on government officials.
The 1984 amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1203, 98 Stat. 2152 (1984), (1) added the
Deputy Attorney General and Associate Attorney General to the list of officials who may be
specially designated to approve applications for surveillance orders under § 2516(1), and request
for emergency surveillance under § 2518(7); (2) added fraud by wire, radio, or television,
witness tampering and retaliation, and sexual exploitation of children to the crimes
encompassed by § 2516(1) (c); and (3) added the immediate danger of death or serious physical
injury to the circumstances in which emergency surveillance can be conducted under § 2518(7)
(Cited inJAMES G. CARR, THE LIAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.3, at 2-7 to 2-8 nn.28-28.1
(1993)).
61. The 1986 amendments, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), extended the coverage
of Title III to electronic communications, cellular telephones, and data transmissions, added or
altered definitions to correspond with the expanded coverage, added new penalty provisions,
increased the range of offenses that can be investigated by a Title III order, and made several
procedural changes in the statute. Provisions were also added to regulate the use of pen
registers and trace devices, and the acquisition of toll records. See generally S. REP. No. 541, supra
note 17, at 11-50, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3565-3604 (providing detailed analysis of
modifications made to Title III by ECPA).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 17-18 (stating that pre-ECPA Title III failed to
anticipate advent of "text, digital or machine communication" and increasing use of
communications that are not routed through communications common carriers, such as E-mail,
videotex, and other private services).
63. See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 3. An OTA study begins by asserting
that "[a]dvances in electronics, semiconductors, computers, imaging, data bases, and related
technologies have greatly increased the technical options for surveillance activities." Id. Further,
the OTA suggested that the advent of cordless telephones, electronic mail, and pagers are
vulnerable to monitoring, and that Title III came into being at a time when "electronic
surveillance was limited primarily to simple telephone taps and concealed microphones (bugs)."
Id.
64. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at iii.
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phone system, as well as the introduction of electronic services such
as E-mail, fell outside the scope of Title III.65 This shortfall was
primarily due to the fact that these new methods of communication
are not "aurally acquired," thus making the current law obsolete.66
Congress responded to the recognized deficiencies of Title III by
introducing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA).67 The ECPA was intended to "update and clarify Federal
privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new
computer and telecommunications technologies," and to offset the
fact that the existing Title III was "hopelessly out of date."'
1. Expanded coverage of the ECPA
The most comprehensive amendments to Title III added by the
ECPA focused on the definitions contained in § 2510.69 Of these
changes, one of the most significant was the addition of § 2510(12),
adding and defining "electronic communication." The phrase is
defined very broadly,71 and encompasses any communication "not
carried by sound waves and [those that] cannot fairly be categorized
as containing the human voice."72  Further, the term "electronic
65. The OTA study presented a litany of communications services that evolved after
enactment of Tide III, including satellite, digital switching, cellular, cordless telephones,
electronic mail, computer, and electronic bulletin boards. All of these were beyond the scope
of pre-ECPA Title 1m. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 3.
66. See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 3 (stating that Title HI protection has
"not kept pace with these technological changes"). The OTA study noted that the pre-ECPA
Tide III protected "only conversations... capable of being heard by the human ear." Id. at 19-
20. This reasoning was echoed by Congress when it considered the ECPA. See S. REP. No. 541,
supra note 17, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556 (stating that pre-ECPA Title III is
.expressly limited to the unauthorized aural interception of wire or oral communications. It
only applies where the contents of a communication can be overheard and understood by the
human ear."); H.L REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 18-19 (recognizing that data transmissions
cannot be "aurally intercepted," which is predicate to violation of pre-ECPA Title III).
67. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555.
68. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 1-2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555-56.
69. The ECPA amended § 2510 to include definitions for "electronic communication,"
"electronic communications system," "electronic communications service," "electronic storage,"
and "aural transfer." S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3568.
70. Id. The addition of "electronic communication" to Title III opened the door for the
protection of a host of modern communications technologies not covered prior to 1986. See id.
(noting that addition of electronic communications into statute now provides protection to
communications not "carried by sound waves").
71. "Electronic communication" is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988).
72. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3568.
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communication" was inserted in the statute wherever Title III had
previously referenced only wire and oral communications.
73
In addition, the legislative history of the ECPA's amendment to §
2510(1) makes it clear that Congress intended to expand Title III to
cover not only interceptions of communications sent via common
carriers, but also to private telephone networks.74 Congress also
rewrote the definition of "intercept" found at § 2510(4). Under the
old Title III definition, "intercept" encompassed only the aural
acquisition of a wire or oral communication. 5 Thus, only sound-
producing communications could be intercepted. 76  The ECPA
revised the definition of "intercept" to include both "aural" and other
means of acquiring wire, oral, or electronic communications. 7 The
express intent of Congress in amending the definition of "intercept"
was to bring "electronic" communications within the purview of Title
III and to provide protection for the "non-voice portion of a wire
communication."78
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (adding "electronic" to "wire" and "oral" communications
included in definition of "intercept"); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (a) (adding "electronic" communi-
cations, in addition to "wire" and "oral," to base offense).
74. See S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 17, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556-57 ("It
does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via common carrier is protected by the
current federal wiretap statute, while the same phone call transmitted via a private telephone
network such as those used by many major U.S. corporations today, would not be covered by
the statute."). Section 2510(1) was modified by changing the language from "any person
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities" to "any person engaged
in providing or operating such facilities." The deletion of the common carrier requirement
allowed Congress to bring private telephone systems within the ambit of Tide III. It also
removed the primary basis for the district court's holding in United States v. Christman, 375 F.
Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974), indicating that the ECPA would have brought about a different
result in that case.
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing applicability ofpre-ECPA Tide III
only to communications that could be aurally acquired).
76. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Christman).
77. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-
2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Because Tide III applies only to the
interception of communications, "intercept" is one of the more critical operative terms in the
statute for determining whether a violation has occurred. If the activity in question does not
involve interception, as defined by § 2510(4), Title III is inapplicable, although constitutional
restraints may still apply to the particular activity without reference to Tide III. As amended in
1986, § 2510(4) defines "interception" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The legislative history to the 1986 amendments states that the
addition of the reference to "other" acquisition (in addition to aural) is intended to make clear
that "it is illegal to intercept the non-voice portion of a wire communication, such as the
digitized portion of a voice communication." SeeS. REP. NO. 541, supra note 17, at 12, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.N. at 3566; H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 34.
78. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3567.
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To further expand the protections of the ECPA, Congress added a
new title, § 2701, covering "stored communications. ''79  Under its
provisions, any party who "(1) intentionally accesses without authoriza-
tion a facility through which an electronic communication is provided;
or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility...
while it is in electronic storage" may be subject to both fines and
imprisonment as provided in § 2701 (b)."° Finally, Congress amend-
ed § 2511, concerning the interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications, by increasing the minimum damages award a
plaintiff may receive from $1000 to $10,000,1 and added a new civil
damages provision to create a private right of action for violation of
the stored communications provisions of § 2701.2
2. Retention of pre-ECPA statutory exceptions
While the post-ECPA Title III does protect many forms of commu-
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988). Title II of the ECPA established guidelines for the protection
of stored communications, with the intended goal of addressing the rising problem of unautho-
rized parties gaining access to private wire and electronic communications. See Pub. L. No. 99-
508, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3589.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). The ECPA added a definition of "electronic storage" at §
2510(17). Electronic storage is defined as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and.., any storage
of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communication." Id. § 2510(17) (A)-(B).
Although the primary focus of the stored communications provisions was the protection of
E-mail, the reference to stored wire communications in § 2510(17) indicates that voice mail was
considered to be within the purview of this section. See H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7 at 63
(discussing ECPA, and stating that both E-mail and voice mail are subject to general prohibitions
added by § 2701). The Senate Report on the ECPA appears to take a somewhat different view
of voice mail, stating that the ECPA amendments "specify that wire communications in storage
like voice mail, remain wire communications, and are protected accordingly." S. REP. No. 541,
supra note 17, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3566. This disparity is significant because
the degree of privacy protection afforded wire and electronic communications appears to differ
based on whether the communication is being transmitted, and thus protected under § 2511
of the ECPA, or in electronic storage, which subjects the communication to § 2701 protection.
The variable protection offered by these two provisions is discussed in greater detail supra note
70 and accompanying text.
81. See Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1854 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2520) (reviewing
amended civil remedies available pursuant to ECPA). Section 2520, as amended, included (1)
declaratory or equitable relief; (2) damages consisting of the greater of a plaintiff's actual
damages and "any profits the violator made as a result of the violation" or "statutory damages"
of either $100 per day or $10,000, whichever is greater, and (3) reasonable attorney's fees and
litigation costs. Id.
82. Id., 100 Stat. at 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701). New § 2707 included:
(1) declaratory or equitable relief as appropriate; (2) damages consisting of "actual damages
suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation," with
a minimum recovery of $1000; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs. Id. It is
evident from the civil damages provisions that the minimum amount of civil damages prescribed
for violations of stored communications are substantially less than those available for a wrongful
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. This suggests a congressional intent
to provide a lower degree of protection to stored communications, although no such intent is
explicit in the legislative history.
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nication that previously lacked a legal shield, the ECPA retained or
redefined many of the statutory provisions existing prior to the 1986
amendments, which provided employers with broad authority to
monitor employee communications.
a. "Extension telephone" and "ordinary course of business"
exceptions
In the ECPA, Congress amended the definition of the term
"intercept" to encompass acquisitions other than aural acquisitions
and to include electronic communications in addition to wire and
oral communications."a Further, Congress amended the scope of an
intercepting device to include those capable of intercepting electronic
communications.84 While adding to the scope of protected commu-
nications with one hand, Congress legislatively took away those
protections with the other.85 This is most apparent in the modifica-
tions made by the ECPA to what is commonly termed the "extension
telephone exception."8 Under the pre-ECPA Title III,7 an exten-
sion telephone used to monitor the telephone call of another party
was arguably not an intercepting device if provided by a communica-
tions common carrier in the ordinary course of business and used by
the subscriber in a manner consistent with the uses of an extension
telephone in the ordinary course of business.88 With the enactment
83. Id., 100 Stat. at 1849 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511). The statute reads in pertinent part:
"'intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the contents, of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device." 18 U.S.C. §
2510(4) (1988).
84. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat, at 1849 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)).
85. For example, the ECPA added to the list of protected communications those transmit-
ted electronically, and provided a broadly inclusive definition of such communications. At the
same time, however, Congress minimized the scope of this inclusion by retaining and expanding
the language of § 2511(2) (a) (j), which prevents the provider of a wire or electronic
communication service from being culpable for violations of the general liability provisions of
§ 2511(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
86. See Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
87. For examples of pre-ECPAjudicial applications of the "telephone extension exemption,"
compare United States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that random
monitoring of conversation over privately operated communications system is not forbidden by
ECPA) and United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding that acquisition of
content of telephone conversation through telephone equipment used in ordinary course of
business was not unlawful) with Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that supervisor who listened to employee's conversation did so in ordinary course of
business) and Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that personal
call may be intercepted in ordinary course of business to determine nature, though never con-
tent).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a) (i) (1982), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a) (i) (1988); see also
Christman, 375 F. Supp. at 1355 (holding, in part, that extension phone used to monitor
employee misconduct, which has been provided to subscriber by communications common
carrier as part of its regular business, and is used in ordinary course of business by subscriber,
cannot be intercepting device under Title III). Not all courts agree with the Christman holding
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of the ECPA, the requirement that the "intercepting device" have
been provided by a communications common carrier 9 was replaced
by a more easily satisfied requirement that the "intercepting device"
be furnished by "a provider of wire or electronic communication
service in the ordinary course of its business" and used by the
subscriber "in the ordinary course of its business."9" This change
brought private telephone networks within the scope of the exception,
and arguably allows the owners of private networks to escape liability
for monitoring employee telephone calls.
b. System provider exception
The ECPA amended § 2511(2) (a) (i) in a manner similar to §
2510(5) (a) (i), expanding its scope to include private communication
networks.9 This change allows an employee of a business with a
private communications system to intercept other employees
messages, so long as doing so is within the normal course of the
employee's employment 92 and the interception occurs either as a
that the "device" aspect is dispositive of whether or not a violation of the statute has occurred.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Campiti v. Walonis rejected the holding in Christman and
argued that the applicability of Title III "should not turn on the type of equipment that is used,
but whether the privacy of telephone conversations has been invaded in a manner offensive to
the words and intent of the Act." Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979). The
ECPA has not helped to eliminate the focus on the "device" issue. Rather, the "business
extension" exception remains intact, and now applies to either wire or electronic communica-
tions services where both the installation and the use of the equipment are deemed to be in the
ordinary course of business.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) (1988).
90. Id. One pair of commentators, in reviewing whether the "intercepting device" or the
circumstances surrounding the interception should be the focus of the inquiry, has argued that
the better approach is to determine whether the intercepting device was used in a manner
consistent with the subscriber's ordinary course of business. Barnett & Makar, supra note 24,
at 726. These commentators rejected a result that would allow an employer to indiscriminately
monitor employee telephone communications and yet avoid liability under Title III merely
because the monitoring device was an extension telephon. Id.
91. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1851 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2) (a) (i) (1988)). Section 2511(2) (a) (i) substituted "a provider of wire or electronic
communication service" for "any communication common carrier." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a) (i).
This ECPA exception for private communications providers contemplates a limited right to
intercept or otherwise use electronic messages:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an... officer, employee, or agent of a
provider of [an] electronic communication service ... to intercept, disclose, or use
that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection
of the rights or property of the provider of that service.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if in a business context, an employee acts to intercept a message
outside the scope of the intercepting employee's job duties, or if the interception is not
necessary and incidental to providing the wire or electronic communications service or to
protecting the employer's property rights in the system, the interception is not protected by the
ECPA.
92. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. at 1851 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2) (a) (i)).
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result of a necessary activity or occurs as a result of protecting the
provider's rights or property.
93
The ECPA also retained language in § 2511(2) (a) (i) expressly
prohibiting the provider of wire communication services to the public
from routine observation or random monitoring of communications
except for "mechanical or service quality control checks."94 No such
bar exists for electronic communications systems.9" Congress' failure
to limit routine observation and random monitoring with respect to
electronic communications systems may have been intentional.96
This variation in treatment appears predicated on the belief that
electronic communications services had a greater need for such
observation and monitoring as a means to properly route message
traffic.97 Thus, § 2511(2) (a) (i) leaves E-mail messages susceptible to
random interception, and accordingly more vulnerable to privacy
invasions than voice mail messages.9"
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i); see also S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 20, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3574.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). The legislative history to this section explained that
electronic communications services may be subject to forms of system monitoring that are
deemed necessary to the proper functioning of the service because such monitoring does not
involve "human listening in on voice conversations." S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 20, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3574. This is distinguished from similar monitoring of wire communications,
which remained expressly prohibited by § 2511 (2) (a) (i). Id.
95. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 20, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3574.
96. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 20, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.N. at 3574 (noting
in legislative history of ECPA that random service monitoring of electronic communications
systems is justifiable, as opposed to similar service monitoring of wire communications, which
is not justifiable).
97. The legislative history of the ECPA specifically addresses this point:
In applying the second clause only to wire communications, this provision reflects an
important technical distinction between electronic communications and traditional
voice telephone [wire] service. The provider of electronic communications services
may have to monitor a stream of transmissions in order to properly route, terminate,
and otherwise manage the individual messages they contain.
S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 20, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3574.
One member of the popular press has arrived at a similar conclusion:
It's illegal for an employer to listen in on a person's telephone conversations even if
those conversations take place on a company-owned phone. But there are no such
clear privacy rules for the electronic mail that moves on a company's computer
network. The major problem with offering privacy on a computer network is that a
network administrator needs to have total access in order to properly maintain it.
Stephen C. Miller, Privacy in E-Mail? Better to Assume It Doesn't Exist, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992,
§ 3, at 8.
98. The Senate report on the ECPA suggests that the dichotomy between potentially
protected voice mail messages and unprotected E-mail messages may have been intentional. The
legislative history categorizes voice mail as a wire communication protected under the ECPA.
S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556. When a voice mail
message is stored, it retains the inherent character of a wire communication. The Senate
determined that "wire" communications include "digitized communications to the extent that
they contain the human voice at the point of origin, reception, or some point in between." Id.
at 3566. The legislative history further states that "[a] private telephone system established by
a company whose activities affect interstate commerce, would also be covered." Id. In
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c. Exceptions under the stored communications provisions
During its consideration of the ECPA, Congress stated that the
stored communications provisions were intended to address "the
growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access
to, or sometimes tampering with, [stored] electronic or wire commu-
nications."99 Congress nonetheless added language that appears to
broadly protect the providers of stored electronic or wire communica-
tions systems from liability for accessing such systems.100 It remains
to be seen to what degree courts will bar employer liability based on
this subsection.
II. STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
There are relatively few cases interpreting Title III and the ECPA
amendments in the employer-monitoring context. This is most likely
a result of alternative avenues of redress, such as common law and
state privacy statutes.10t To date, all the federal court cases that
have considered the issue are based on telephone-system monitor-
ing.102 Further, the vast majority were decided under the pre-ECPA
comparison, the legislative history indicates that the provider of an electronic communications
service will not be liable for accessing stored communications on the system it has provided. Id.
at 3590. Thus, a voice mail message, classified as a wire communication, bears an apparently
greater degree of ECPA protection than does an E-mail message. The legislative history is silent
as to the purpose of distinguishing between the two.
99. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3589.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1988). This section states that accessing stored wire or
electronic communications will not be unlawful if the system is accessed pursuant to
authorization "by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service."
Id. This provision has not been tested in the courts, and commentators disagree about its scope.
See Hernandez, supra note 19, at 39 (arguing that language of § 2701(c) (1) allows provider of
E-mail or voice mail system to access all stored messages without risk of liability). But see
Baumhart, supra note 19, at 925-26 (noting that at least one commentator views § 2701 (c) (1)
"as a blanket license for employers to peruse and disclose employee E-mail communications
transmitted through company-owned systems," but countering that employers should not rely
too heavily on this language given clear congressional intent to strengthen individual privacy
rights through enactment of ECPA).
101. See supra note 16 (discussing various state causes of action that mirror Title III).
102. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that landlord did
not violate Title III because tenant consented to interception of incoming telephone calls);
Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that police officer's interception
of inmates' telephone conversations was unlawful); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 467 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (stating that Title III did not exempt interspousal telephone interceptions). The
federal courts have not yet decided a case brought pursuant to the wiretap statutes by an
employee against an employer for unlawfully accessing that employee's E-mail or voice mail
accounts pursuant to the wiretap statutes. There are, however, several lower court cases
pending, or on appeal, in California for employer accessing of E-mail messages. Most of these
claims are based on state privacy law. See Cameron v. Mentor Graphics, No. 716361 (Cal. Sup.
CL, Santa Clara Cty., filed Nov. 7, 1991) (claiming wrongful termination resulting from employer
reading employee E-mail, where employer apparently searched employee's E-mail for sole
purpose of finding incriminating information to supportjust-cause termination action, allowing
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Title III.1"3 These decisions reflect two analytical approaches to
deciding whether to impose employer liability under Title III. In one
set of cases, the courts emphasized that a legitimate business
purpose° 4 justified the employer monitoring. The other cases focus
on the subject matter of the call as supporting the employer's interest
in monitoring.
A. "Legitimate Business Purpose" Cases
United States v. Harpel °5 involved the criminal provisions of Title
II.106 Harpel, a former police officer, was charged with disclosing
the contents of telephone conversations between other officers that
had been unlawfully taped.017  There was no evidence as to who
made the tapes, and the police station where the tapes were evidently
made possessed numerous telephone extensions, making such a
determination difficult.' Nevertheless, Harpel was convicted of
disclosing the contents of unlawfully intercepted wire communications
employer to avoid its contractual promise to honor stock options); Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co.,
No. YC003979 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Los Angeles Cry., filed 1989); Flanagan v. Epson America, No.
BC007036 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., filed 1989). One case brought under California
Penal Code § 631, was recently dismissed when the presiding judge found that the provision
covered only telegraph interception and telephone wiretapping, but not electronic communica-
tions such as E-mail. Metz, supra note 19, at 26 (citing Shoars v. Epson Am., No. SCW112749
(Cal. Sup. Ct, Los Angeles Cty., filed 1989)); cf. supra note 16 (comparing state wiretapping
statutes providing private right of action and noting that some states provide protection only for
oral or wire communications, while other states protect electronic communications in addition
to wire and oral communications).
103. See, e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 584 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that
employer's monitoring policy must not extend beyond what was necessary to determine that call
was personal); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding
that manager's monitoring of phone call between employee and competitor was within ordinary
course of business); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that
telephone extension used without consent to surreptitiously record private conversation is not
within ordinary course of business); Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392,
393-94 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (finding telephone company's monitoring activities were not unlawful
interceptions because purpose was for quality control, employees knew of monitoring, and there
were separate phones available for personal calls), af'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (concluding that monitoring and
recording conversations over department store's privately operated intercommunications system,
after notice of improprieties occurring in store, was not unlawful interception); United States
v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140, 1142 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (holding telephone company not guilty of
unlawful wiretapping because prosecution failed to prove telephone company was common
carrier and operating facilities for transmission of interstate or foreign communications).
104. This framework looks at whether: (1) the employer had a reasonable business justifica-
tion for the intrusion; (2) employees were provided notice of the possibility of monitoring- and
(3) the employer acted consistently with respect to the extent of monitoring of which employees
were warned.
105. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
106. United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 348 (10th Cir. 1974).
107. Id
108. Id.
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under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (a)." 9 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit,
Harpel argued that it was likely that the conversation was recorded via
an extension telephone and, therefore, based on the telephone
extension exception, he could not be found liable."' The Tenth
Circuit rejected Harpel's theory as too rigid an interpretation of the
statutory exemption."' Instead, the court focused on the privacy
rights at the heart of Title III, holding that "a telephone extension
used without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record a
private telephone conversation is not used in the ordinary course of
business." 2 Thus, such conduct was not immune under Title
111.113
In James v. Newspaper Agency Corp.,114 the Tenth Circuit once again
considered the applicability of the "extension telephone" exception,
but in the context of employer telephone monitoring with a goal of
helping employees provide better service to the public."' In James,
a former employee of the Newspaper Agency Corporation sued under
Title III, claiming that her calls had been unlawfully intercepted."
6
The court, in finding that the employer was not liable, emphasized
that employees were provided with advance notice of the monitoring,
the installation of the monitoring equipment was not performed
secretively, and no employee protested the installation at the time it
occurred.17  Based on this reasoning, the court held that the
employer's monitoring fell "squarely within" the ordinary course of
business exception of § 2510(5) (a)."'
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reached
a similar conclusion in Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co." 9
In that case, the plaintiff was a former employee of Southwestern Bell
who responded to customer service calls placed through a central
switchboard. 2 ' The calls were routinely monitored by supervisory
personnel to ensure quality control and to minimize personal use of
109. Id.
110. Id. at 351.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Thus, not only would the party intercepting and recording the telephone conversa-
tion be liable under Title III, but also any party disclosing the contents of the recorded
conversation. Id. at 348-49.
114. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
115. James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 579, 581-82 (10th Cir. 1979).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 581.
118. Id.
119. 452 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Okla. 1978), af'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
120. Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 393 (W.D. Okla. 1978), af'd,
611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the lines.' After being fired for placing personal calls, the plaintiff
sued, claiming that Southwestern Bell had violated Title III by
monitoring his calls.'22 The court held that Southwestern Bell was
not liable because there was a written policy, of which all the
employees were aware, that prohibited personal use of the service
telephones. 23  Further, Southwestern Bell maintained separate
telephones for employee personal calls, which were not monitored,
and the plaintiff had previously been warned to cease using the
service telephones for personal calls. 24 The court concluded that
the defendant's conduct was within both the letter and the spirit of
Title III's authorization of telephone interceptions.125
B. "Subject of the Call" Cases
Decisions falling within the "subject of the call" rubric focus on the
specific content of the monitored telephone calls, and establish the
basic rule that calls relating to the business of the employer may be
intercepted. Thus, intercepting such calls is within the ordinary
course of business and is legal. On the other hand, personal calls
cannot be intercepted, except to the extent necessary to determine
whether or not the call is personal. 26
In Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.,127 the Eleventh Circuit focused on
the subject matter of a monitored conversation in determining
whether an employer was liable under Title 111.128 At the time of
the interception giving rise to the suit, Watkins was employed as a
telephone sales representative for L.M. Berry & Company. 29 The
company maintained a policy of monitoring employee sales calls over
a standard extension telephone'30 as part of its on-going training
program.13 ' Employees were permitted to use their business tele-
121. Id.
122. Id. at 394. The plaintiff sought damages for his alleged wrongful termination. Id.
123. Id. at 396.
124. Id. The court did note, however, that if Southwestern Bell had monitored employee
calls placed on the telephones designated for private use, then the court "would wholeheartedly
agree that [Bell] had overstepped its limited privilege." Id.
125. Id. at 397.
126. The problems with this approach become readily apparent. For instance, ifa personal
call may be monitored only to the extent necessary to determine that it is personal in nature,
what is a reasonable amount of time for an employer to monitor a call and determine it is, in
fact, personal? Further, what are the employer's duties should the call be both personal and
business-related in nature? The cases that accompany this discussion do not answer these
questions.
127. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
128. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582-83 (11th Cir. 1983).




THE AMERICAN UNIVERsrIy LAW REVIEW [Vol.44:219
phones for personal calls, and were told by the company that personal
calls would not be monitored, except to the extent necessary to
determine whether the call was personal.
1 1
2
The telephone call that gave rise to this suit was a personal call
received by Watkins during her lunch break. l3 During this call,
Watkins discussed a job interview she recently had with another
company.134 Unbeknownst to Watkins, the call was being monitored
by her supervisor.135 Shortly thereafter, Watkins was summoned to
her supervisor's office, and when she realized that her call had been
monitored an argument ensued, after which she was fired. 3 "
L.M. Berry & Company argued that the supervisor's monitoring was
not unlawful under Title III because Watkins knew that the company
monitored calls and thus had consented to the interception.13 7 The
court quickly dispensed with that theory, stating that the general
policy of monitoring business calls did not in any way serve as consent
to monitor personal calls. 3 According to the court, to the extent
that Watkins did consent to the monitoring of personal calls, she had
done so in accordance with the company's own policy, which allowed
for monitoring only to the degree necessary to determine that the call
was personal.
13 9
The company also argued that an extension telephone is not an
"intercepting device" under Title III.14 Rejecting that contention,
the court found that the issue was not whether the extension was an
"intercepting device," but rather whether the interception was made
in the ordinary course of the company's business.' In holding that
it was not, the court explained that (1) the call to Watkins had been
in-coming, and thus could not have been a sales call, (2) the caller
was a personal friend, and (3) the subject matter was personal in
nature. 4 2 The Eleventh Circuit also affirmatively concluded that a
personal call may not be intercepted in the ordinary course of
business as prescribed by § 2510(5)(a)(i), except to the extent






137. Id. at 580.
138. Id. at 581-82.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 580-81.
141. Id. at 582.
142. Id.
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misuse of the company's telephone system.14
In Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital of Athens,"4 the plaintiffs were
employees of St. Mary's Hospital, working as emergency medical
technicians. 4 ' The hospital maintained a dispatching console that
received in-coming calls and from which out-going calls could be
placed. 4 ' These calls were automatically recorded. 47  Calls
placed within the confines of the hospital were also routed through
the console, but were not automatically recorded.'
At issue in the case was the recording of a personal call between the
plaintiffs, placed between two points within the hospital facility.'
In the call, the appellants made disparaging comments about hospital
supervisory personnel that were later disclosed.5 0 The technicians
sued for actual and punitive damages under Title III.1"' They
argued that the hospital was not protected by the "extension
telephone" exception because the recording of the call was not in the
ordinary course of the hospital's business.152 The hospital argued
that the recording was within the ordinary course of its business
because the subject of the call concerned matters of employee
relations, which were of importance to the hospital. 5 '
Relying on Watkins, the court agreed with the hospital, stating the
general rule that "if the intercepted call was a business call," then the
"monitoring of it was in the ordinary course of business."154 The
143. Id. The court stated that the phrase "in the ordinary course of business" does not mean
anything that is of interest to a company. Id. The company's interest in Watkins' plans for
other employment did not equate to a legitimate legal interest. Id. The court went on to note
that for a private right of action to exist under Title III, it is unnecessary for the offender to
hear anything in particular. Rather, all that is required is that the "listening in" take place. Id.
at 582-84. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that even if the employer were to legitimately
monitor an employee's call, that is, if the subject matter of the call were related to the
employer's business, this does not mean that the entire call loses privacy protection under Title
III. Id. at 584. If the call should turn to matters of a personal nature, the employer is obligated
to cease monitoring even where the original monitoring would be immunized as in the ordinary
course of business. Id. This analysis reflects the difficulty courts confront in determining
whether the duration of an employer's monitoring was reasonable to decide if a call was of a
personal nature. Judge Smith in the Watkins case stated that something less than three minutes
would seem appropriate. Id. at 584 n.10.
144. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).





150. Id. at 413-14. There is no indication in the court's opinion that the plaintiffs were
terminated or disciplined for statements made during their conversation.
151. Id. at 413.
152. Id. at 416.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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court held that where the call (1) "occurred during office hours," (2)
"between co-employees," (3) "over a specialized extension which
connected the principal office to a substation," and (4) "concerned
scurrilous remarks about supervisory employees in their capacities as
supervisors" the call was business in nature. 55 The court noted
specifically that issues involving employee relations implicated the
legal interests of the hospital. 56
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar problem in
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co.'57 In Briggs, one of the plaintiffs was
a former salesman of defendant American Air Filter.' The other
plaintiff worked for a competing business, yet maintained close
contact with the employee of the defendant.159 A manager at
American Air Filter's Atlanta office, suspecting that his employee
might be disclosing sensitive business information to the other
company, listened in on a telephone conversation between the two,
over an extension telephone. 6 ° The conversation included topics
related to American Air Filter's business.
1 6'
The plaintiffs filed suit under Title III, and it fell to the court to
determine whether American Air Filter was entitled to protection
under the "extension telephone" exception. 6 2 Despite the fact that
the plaintiffs had no advanced notice of the possibility of monitoring,
the court held that American Air Filter was protected. 163 The court
based this conclusion on a number of factors. First, the plaintiffs
admitted that the call was related to American Air Filter's busi-
ness." Second, the actual monitoring took place only long enough
to confirm the suspicions of the company.65 Third, the specific act
155. Id. at 417.
156. Id. Judge Phyllis Kravitch, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that
Congress enacted Title III to punish and deter eavesdropping, not to focus on the conduct of
the person subject to the eavesdropping. Id. (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (disagreeing with majority's reliance on employees' conduct and conversation to
determine whether employer's actions were in ordinary course of business). She argued that
the intent of Congress was not to divide conversations into "protected and unprotected
categories." Id. Instead, for the "extension telephone" exception to apply, the call must be
more than merely related to business, but must advance a legitimate business purpose, and this
purpose must exist at the time the monitoring takes place. Id. at 417-18.
157. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
158. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1980).
159. Id. at 416.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 417.
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at issue was not part of a general policy of monitoring. 66
In the more recent case of Deal v. Spears,167 a court again faced
the problem of determining the applicability of the "extension
telephone" exception to employer monitoring. " The plaintiff vas
an employee in the defendant Spear's liquor store. 6 9 In response
to a burglary of the store, Spears installed a recording device on an
extension telephone to record all in-coming and out-going calls from
the store, believing that an employee was involved in the theft and
hoping that any incriminating statements made over the store
telephone would be recorded.170 The defendant recorded calls for
a two month period, and the plaintiff was terminated based on the
contents of a call that indicated she sold liquor at a reduced price,
against store policy.'7 ' Although no evidence of complicity in the
theft was garnered, many of the calls recorded involved "sexually
provocative" discussions between the plaintiff and another party with
whom she was having an extramarital affair. 2  The plaintiff
brought a civil suit under § 2520 of Title I1.17 3
Spears argued that the plaintiff had implicitly consented to the
monitoring and recording, or, in the alternative, his conduct was
protected by the "extension telephone" exception.'74 The court
rejected any notion that the plaintiff had consented to the monitor-
ing, as demonstrated by the nature of her conversations, which clearly
indicated that she had no knowledge that the telephone was, or could
be, monitored."' With respect to the "extension telephone"
exception, the court turned to the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Watkins, concluding that a personal call may be intercepted in the
ordinary course of business to determine its nature, but never its
contents.1'7 Because the defendant had intentionally recorded all
calls, regardless of their nature, took no steps to limit the monitoring,
and taped and disclosed calls that served no legitimate business
166. Id. The court noted the importance of the legitimate business purpose as ajustification
for the interception, and stated that under less compelling circumstances the employer might
be required to show that prior warnings had been made to employees. Id. at 420 n.9.
167. 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
168. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992).
169. Id. at 1155.
170. Id. at 1155-56.
171. Id. at 1156.
172. Id. at 1155. The contents of the various recorded calls led Senior District CourtJudge
Harris to dub this a "case of sex, lies and audio tapes." Deal v. Spears, 780 F. Supp. 618, 620
(W.D. Ark. 1991), afI'd, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
173. Dea4 980 F.2d at 1155.
174. Id. at 1156-57.
175. Id. at 1157.
176. Id. at 1158.
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purpose, he was not entitled to the protection of the statutory
exception.
177
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK MEETS
THE MODERN TECHNOLOGIES
To assess the likelihood that office technologies such as E-mail and
voice mail would be protected under the post-ECPA Title III, it is
necessary to draw analogies to the cases applying the statute to
extension telephones. Additionally, it is important to understand the
variations in the statutory protection provided to electronic and wire
communications in the transmission phase, and the same communica-
tions once stored.
A. Comparing the Cases to E-mail and Voice Mail
As the case law suggests, employees have no automatic right to, or
expectation of, privacy when using their employer's telephone.
178
At the same time, certain circumstances make it unlawful for an
employer to listen in on an employee's telephone conversations, even
when those conversations take place on company-owned equip-
ment.179 What this has come to mean, through the defining process
of litigation, is that under Title III employers cannot deliberately
monitor an employee's personal calls unless they fall within one of
the statutory exceptions.'
As discussed in Part II, the cases applying Title III to telephone
systems reflect two possible approaches to determining employer
liability: whether the employer has a legitimate business purpose for
monitoring, and whether the subject matter of the communications
is inherently protected. Either approach may protect communications
via voice mail or E-mail systems, depending on the circumstances.
Assuming a court focused on content, then the general rule of the
Epps, Watkins, Briggs, and Deal line of cases would apply. As a general
177. Id. The district court awarded the plaintiff S40,000 in statutory damages and attorney's
fees pursuant to § 2520(c) (2) (B), but denied their request for punitive damages. Deal 780 F.
Supp. at 624-25. On appeal, although the Eighth Circuit concluded that the scope of the
eavesdropping went far "beyond the boundaries of the ordinary course of business," Deal 980
F.2d at 1158, the court held that the employers' violations of Title III did not warrant the
imposition of punitive damages because the violations were not wanton, reckless, or malicious.
Id. at 1159.
178. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (addressing limited scope of employee privacy
recognized by case law).
179. An employer can only monitor an employee's telephone call to determine its nature,
but never its contents. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577,583 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (finding
employer justified in listening to call to determine whether call was personal or business).
180. See Deal; 780 F. Supp. at 622.
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premise, a court would allow any business-related communication to
be monitored because it implicates the legal and legitimate business
interests of the employer. 8" By the same token, personal communi-
cations would be protected under Title III regardless of the circum-
stances, and could only be monitored to the extent necessary to
determine that they are personal. 82 Thus, under the subject matter
approach, E-mail and voice mall should receive the same degree of
protection as telephonic communications.
The James and Simmons line of cases focuses, instead, on whether
the employer has a legitimate business purpose for monitoring
employee communications. 83  That employees were on notice of
the possibility of monitoring, employers relied on a reasonable
business justification for the monitoring, and actions by the employer
were consistent with its monitoring policy are all dispositive proof that
a legitimate business purpose exists. With respect to E-mail and voice
mail systems, the subject matter approach should protect employee
communications.
B. Irrationality of Title III
Although Title III, as judicially interpreted, offers some minimal
degree of employee privacy in E-mail and voice mail communications,
such widely variable approaches in the application of Title III suggest
significant weaknesses in the statutory construction. This is perhaps
no more apparent than in the ECPA amendments that provide for
differing levels of privacy protection for stored and non-stored
communications.
The general prohibition against eavesdropping on wire, oral, or
electronic communications addressed in § 2511(1) (a) protects such
communications from "interception."'84 Although the definition of
"intercept" found in § 2510(4) sets out the means by which a
prohibited interception occurs,185 it does not specify the temporal
181. As the Eleventh Circuit implied in Watkins, for an employer's interception of employee
telephone communications to be protected under Title III, the employer must have a legal
interest in that communication, not merely curiosity. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582.
182. See id. at 583 (stating that "personal call may not be intercepted in the ordinary course
of business under [Title III], except to the extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use
of the telephone or to determine whether a call is personal or not").
183. SeeJames v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979) (looking to
purpose of employer monitoring to train employees in dealing with public and to protect
employees from abusive customers); Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392,
393 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (focusing on employer monitoring as means to ensure service quality,
to check work in progress, and to provide assistance to employees), afj'd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir.
1979).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1988).
185. Id. § 2510(4).
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point at which an acquisition is in fact an "interception," and thus
proscribed. Based on the common definition of "intercept," meaning
to "interrupt the progress or course of,"'186 the acquisition of a wire,
oral, or electronic communication will constitute an "interception,"
only while being transmitted in a manner prescribed by
§ 2511 (1) (b) (i)-(iii) .187
By contrast, the stored communications provisions of § 2701
prohibit the unauthorized accessing of wire or electronic communica-
tions once stored. 88 While the distinction between the terms
"intercept" and "access" has little significance for forms of communi-
cation that only exist as transmissions, and are never stored, the
distinction is critical when a transmitted communication is later
electronically stored, because it is at the time of storage that a
communication becomes subject to different provisions of the EGPA.
This is the case with both E-mail and voice mail messages, 189 both
of which have a transmission phase and a storage phase. 9 During
the transmission phase, any protection against unlawful interception
under Title III is governed by § 2511.191 On arrival in storage, the
same messages are subject to § 2701.192 Thus, the same message is
subject to differing standards of protection merely because it exists in
a different statutorily defined medium.
This conclusion identifies a particularly irrational result in the
employer monitoring context. Under § 2511 (1) (a) an employer, even
if the owner and provider of the communications system, is limited in
the extent to which employee communications can be intercepted
while being transmitted. The federal case law considering telephone
systems clearly establishes a framework in which employer monitoring
is and is not permissible. On the other hand, § 2701(c) (1) appears
186. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1176 (1986). "Intercept" derives
from the Latin word intercipere meaning to seize in transit. Id. Compare the term "access,"
which is defined as "a way by which a thing... may be reached." Id. at 11.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(i)-(iii).
188. Id. § 2701(a)(1) (barring unauthorized intentional accessing of stored electronic
communications).
189. The Office of Technology Assessment report that preceded and precipitated the ECPA
amendments to Title III noted that electronic mail exists at five discrete stages: "(I) at the
terminal or in the electronic files of the sender, (2) while being communicated, (3) in the
mailbox of the receiver, (4) when printed into hardcopy before mailing, and (5) when retained
in the files of the electronic mail company for administrative purposes." ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 45. Similarly, voice mail starts its journey as a wire communica-
tion, but becomes a stored communication once recorded.
190. See supra notes 7-8 (discussing basic E-mail and voice mail technology respectively).
191. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text (discussing amendments made to Title III
by enactment of ECPA).
192. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing ECPA amendment relating to
"stored communications").
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to grant the provider of the wire or electronic communications service
blanket permission to monitor stored communications.19 3  The
provider in this context will almost certainly be the employer.
194
Thus, the limitations imposed on employer interceptions of wire or
electronic communications vanish once the same communication is
in storage. Accordingly, in order to avoid Title III liability, an
employer need only access employee communications once they have
been stored. This seems an insupportable result given Congress'
emphasis of individual privacy rights during passage of the ECPA.195
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Employees in the private sector are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.19 6 Consequently, they must rely on other federal
enactments, state statutes, or common law to ensure their privacy
rights. While employers arguably need information about employees
regarding their conduct and performance, this need must be
balanced against employees' reasonable expectations of privacy.1
97
The following discussion suggests ways for employers to balance their
need for information with that of employee privacy rights.
A. Employers
Employers must strive to balance their legitimate, identifiable
business needs against their employees' right to privacy and dignity
in the workplace. Employers, however, can do much to minimize
potential morale problems and legal challenges based on employee
expectations of privacy in office communications by doing some basic
review and planning in their personnel policies and procedures. The
following suggestions are offered to assist employers in striking an
appropriate balance between the needs of the business and the
employee.
First, publish and post a policy defining the intended business uses
193. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
194. In its consideration of the ECPA, Congress noted that the risks to communications
privacy were, in part, the result of the growth in the development of private communications
system by private companies. H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 18. Congress made this
observation in 1986, and use of private communications systems has increased in the intervening
years.
195. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing significance of privacy consider-
ations in passage of Title III and ECPA).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th
Cir.) (noting that Fourth Amendment is constraint on government action rather than actions
of private individuals), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976).
197. See Baumhart, supra note 19, at 939 (discussing balance between employees' privacy
interest and reasonableness of employer's quality control search).
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of E-mail and voice mail systems, and indicate that these systems may
be accessed by the employer without notice to employees. Employees
should be made aware that E-mail and voice mail are to be used for
business purposes only, and that messages contained on these systems
are considered to be company records. Employee awareness of the
policy will minimize expectations of privacy and likely reduce the
chance of a challenge. 9 The policy should clearly state the proce-
dure that will be implemented by the company and the reason that
such a policy is required. Further, the policy should specify the
company's rationale for accessing employee E-mail or voice mail to
prevent any inference that the company is engaging in "eavesdrop-
ping" without identifiable reasons. The company should promote the
legitimate basis upon which a genuine need exists to access E-mail or
voice mail records.
Second, inform employees of overall company privacy guidelines
and establish a mechanism whereby complaints may be addressed.
Third, clearly outline, to supervisors and managers, corporate
expectations regarding employees' privacy in these systems. Further,
the company should define the circumstances under which managers
can search for, or interfere with, E-mail and voice mail messages. The
E-mail and voice mail policies should address third-party access, for
example, access by immediate supervisors or co-workers.
Finally, conduct periodic reviews of E-mail and voice mail systems
to affirm that they are being used in accordance with the company's
established guidelines. The policy should also establish guidelines for
recording an employee's unauthorized use of such systems. Thus,
employers seeking to discipline or terminate employees for such
misuse will have documentation to support the employer's actions.
B. Statutory Reform
The ECPA evolved from Congress' recognition of the inherent flaws
in the outdated Title III of 1968. In the House report on the ECPA,
the privacy of citizens was extolled as a key factor mandating passage.
The report notes that if "Congress does not act to protect the privacy
of our citizens, we may see the gradual erosion of a precious right.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that prison
inmates' use of telephone constitutes implied consent to monitoring because inmates were
warned their calls would be monitored);James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581
(10th Cir. 1979) (noting that personnel were notified of telephone monitoring); Simmons v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 396 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (stating that telephone
monitoring was reasonable when all employees knew and acquiesced to monitoring of phone
calls), affd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
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Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it
will gradually erode as technology advances."'99  Similarly, the
Senate recognized in its report on the ECPA the implicit irrationality
of the pre-ECPA Title III when it suggested that " [i] t does not make
sense that a phone call transmitted via common carrier is protected
by the current federal wiretap statute, while the same phone call
transmitted via a private telephone network such as those used by
many major U.S. corporations today, would not be covered by the
statute."2 ' While both Houses explicitly recognized the importance
of communications privacy in any context, for reasons that are not
entirely clear, Congress stopped short of providing broad privacy
protections to emerging technologies used in the private corporate
environment. As was the case in 1986, Titie III is again ripe for
amending.
20'
First, Title III should be amended to account for the judicially
defined conclusion regarding basic telephone systems; that is,
employers cannot deliberately monitor an employee's personal
communications that are made at work.202 This is best achieved by
adding explicit language that permits employer monitoring only
where a legitimate business purpose can be demonstrated. The courts
have shown a willingness to carve out a protected zone of private
communications even in the workplace, and Titie III should incorpo-
rate similar limitations on employer monitoring.
Second, Congress should amend the statute to remove the
irrational distinction between the use of telephones, E-mail, and voice
mail.20 ' The congressional emphasis on privacy issues during
consideration of the ECPA highlights the importance of protecting
the message, not the medium. There is no practical reason why these
199. H.R. RaP. No. 647, supra note 7, at 19.
200. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556-57.
201. In 1993, Congress sought to address the vulnerability of U.S. workers to privacy
intrusions from their employers by introducing the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act,
S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Although the Act would not have prohibited employers from accessing employee E-mail and
voice mail accounts, itwould require employers to provide written notice to employees subjected
to electronic monitoring. S. 984 at 7-8; H.R. 1900 at 6-7. Although intended to prevent
employer's abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace, the Senate bill was never
forwarded from the Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources and the House bill was never acted upon by the House
Committee on Education and Labor after having been forwarded to the full committee from
the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations.
202. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (discussing Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.,
704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983), which established notion that employer may listen to employee's
telephone calls to determine subject, but never content).
203. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text (comparing variable protection provided
by ECPA to E-mail and voice mail communications).
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technologies should be treated differently. Whether a message is
"intercepted," "accessed," or "acquired" should be irrelevant to an
employer's liability, and employee communications should be
protected regardless of whether the message is transmitted or remains
in storage.
Finally, the statutory exception for communications system
providers should be curtailed or eliminated. The current statutory
language has changed little since the passage of Title III in 1968, and
reflects a communications environment dominated by common
carriers. The exception as originally enacted was intended to protect
common carriers from liability while in the normal provision of
service." 4 This is clearly no longer the case, nor is the business
communications market now dependent on major carriers.0 5 This
exception should not be extended to corporate providers of commu-
nications services to employees. Rather, only where a corporation is
able to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for monitoring
employee communications should it be protected from liability.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the ECPA highlights the importance of
individual privacy concerns as a primary reason for bringing E-mail,
voice mail, and other forms of previously unprotected communica-
tions under the umbrella of Title 111.2 °  The Senate Report notes
one's interest in the privacy of correspondence does not change based
on the form the correspondence takes.207 Clearly, the medium is
not the message. In passing Title III and amending it with the ECPA,
however, Congress has created a dual standard that provides
204. See Burnside, supra note 7, at 464-65 (discussing exemption of common carriers from
ambit of Title III).
205. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing profusion of private communica-
tions systems at time of ECPA's passage).
206. The intent of Congress to take account of privacy concerns is further evidenced by
incorporation into the ECPA the Office of Technology Assessment's most rigorous recom-
mendations respecting telephone and electronic communications. In its study, the OTA
suggested three options for congressional consideration regarding telephone surveillance: (1)
extending the protection of Title III to all telephone communications regardless of the trans-
mission technology (analog, digital, cellular, or cordless); (2) formulating specific policies
depending on the technological constraints and possibilities; and (3) taking no action
whatsoever and allowing the courts to define the appropriate level of privacy protection.
ELECrRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 21, at 38. With respect to electronic communications
such as E-mal, the OTA offered Congress three options, again ranging from protecting such
communications at all phases of transmission and storage, to taking no action at all. Id. at 51.
With respect to both wire and electronic communications, Congress adopted the more stringent
of the OTA-proffered options. See generally Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
207. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3559.
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inadequate protection against private employer incursions into
employee communications. Congressional action is again necessary
to clarify the privacy protections established by Title III. To leave
forms of telecommunications technology unprotected merely because
they are newly developed and more advanced than earlier technology
is not in accord with the purpose of Title III. To permit minuscule
technological differences to be dispositive of Title III's protection is
inimical to its intent. The legislative history of Title III is replete with
expressions of concern for privacy interests," 8 and it is in consider-
ation of these privacy concerns that Title III again merits revision.
208. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 24, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153; S.
REP. No. 541, supra note 17, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3559; see also Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (stating that protection of privacy was major concern in
congressional passage of Titie Ill); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(noting that dominant purpose of Tide III was to prevent improper privacy invasions), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
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